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Environmental Law
by Travis M. Trimble*
In 2011,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
held that the intervenors lacked standing to challenge on appeal a
consent decree entered into by the main parties and approved by the
district court in a Clean Water Act2 case.3 The United States District
Court for the Northern District of Alabama, in a Clean Air Act4 case,
excluded on Daubert5 grounds testimony of the government’s experts
purporting to establish that repair and replacement projects at several
power plants in Alabama had in fact been major modifications to the
plants that resulted in increased air pollutant emissions, which would
have required the plants’ operators to obtain pre-construction permits
prior to undertaking the projects.6 Finally, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Alabama, in one of what will surely
be many lawsuits arising out of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig explosion
and spill, dismissed as moot parts of an environmental group’s complaint
challenging a federal agency’s continued sale of leases for deepwater oil
and gas drilling in the Gulf based on inadequate environmental
safeguards, but let stand a portion of the case related to ongoing sales
and approval of leases following the Deepwater Horizon disaster in
reliance on an Environmental Impact Statement prepared in 2007.7
* Instructor, University of Georgia School of Law. Mercer University (B.A., 1986);
University of North Carolina (M.A., 1988); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., 1993).
1. For an analysis of Environmental Law during the prior survey period, see Travis M.
Trimble, Environmental Law, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 62 MERCER L. REV. 1151 (2010).
2. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006).
3. Fla. Wildlife Fed’n, Inc. v. Jackson, 647 F.3d 1296, 1299 (11th Cir. 2011).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7671 (2006).
5. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
6. United States v. Ala. Power Co., 773 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1260 (N.D. Ala. 2011).
7. Defenders of Wildlife v. Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Regulation & Enforcement,
791 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1182 (S.D. Ala. 2011).
1
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I. CLEAN WATER ACT / STANDING
In Florida Wildlife Federation Inc. v. Jackson,8 the Eleventh Circuit
held that intervenor-appellants South Florida Water Management
District and Florida Water Environment Association Utility Council
lacked standing to challenge on appeal a consent decree entered into by
plaintiff environmental advocacy groups and the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), and approved by the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Florida.9 Pursuant to the decree, the
EPA was obligated to promulgate rules establishing numeric nutrient
standards for Florida’s lakes, rivers, and coastal waters.10
The Clean Water Act11 allows states to adopt their own water quality
standards, subject to EPA approval.12 As did many states, Florida
adopted a narrative water quality standard that provided that the
concentration of nutrients in a water body “must not be altered ‘so as to
cause an imbalance in natural populations of aquatic flora or fauna.’”13
In 1998, the EPA and the Department of Agriculture issued a report
stating that 40% of waters tested by various states did not meet water
quality goals and indicated that the EPA expected states that had not
done so to adopt numerical nutrient criteria to replace narrative
standards by 2003.14 In 1999, a group of environmental advocacy
organizations sued the EPA to force it to issue site-specific numeric
water quality standards for certain Florida waterways; the parties
settled this case with a consent decree whereby the EPA agreed to issue
those standards if Florida did not do so itself.15
Although Florida studied the issue, it did not adopt numeric water-
quality standards; so in 2008, five environmental groups sued the EPA,
claiming that the EPA’s 1998 report constituted a determination by the
EPA that Florida’s narrative standard was inadequate, which if true
would impose on the EPA a nondiscretionary duty under the Clean
Water Act to propose and adopt new standards for Florida.16 Thirteen
8. 647 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2011).
9. Id. at 1307.
10. Id.
11. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006).
12. Fla. Wildlife Fed’n, 647 F.3d at 1300.
13. Id.; FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62-302-530(47)(b) (2010).
14. Fla. Wildlife Fed’n, 647 F.3d at 1299-1300.
15. Id. at 1300.
16. Id.; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(4) (2006). The Act requires the EPA to “promptly
prepare and publish proposed regulations setting forth a revised or new water quality
standard” whenever the agency determines that an existing state standard is inadequate.
33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(4).
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parties, including the two appellants, intervened as defendants. While
this suit was pending, the EPA made just such a formal determination,
independent of the suit, that Florida’s narrative standard was inade-
quate, which unequivocally triggered the EPA’s obligation to promulgate
new water quality standards.17
On August 25, 2009, the plaintiffs and the EPA moved for the entry
of a consent decree that would require the EPA to propose numeric
nutrient standards for lakes and flowing waters by January 14, 2010,
and to adopt these standards by October 15, 2010 (again, unless Florida
proposed its own standards acceptable to the EPA), and to propose
standards for coastal and estuarine waters by January 14, 2011, and
adopt them by October 15, 2011. The district court approved the consent
decree by order on December 30, 2009, and the intervenor-appellants
appealed the order, contending on appeal that the consent decree was
“procedurally and substantively unreasonable” and that the district court
abused its discretion by approving it.18 More specifically, the utility
council claimed it would be injured by conflicting compliance directives
between the 1999 consent decree and the 2009 consent decree; by having
a limited opportunity to provide input into the rulemaking process due
to the short timelines imposed by the consent decree; and by the district
court’s denying it an evidentiary hearing before approving the consent
decree. The Water Management District claimed it had been injured by
the parties’ entering a consent decree without an administrative record,
without adequate discovery, and without adequate fairness. The District
also claimed injury from the short time frame set out in the consent
decree for the EPA to adopt the new rules.19
The Eleventh Circuit held that the intervenors lacked constitutional
standing to challenge the consent decree.20 The court first noted that
since the original parties to the case had settled it with the consent
decree, the intervenors must have independent standing to challenge the
decree.21 The court concluded that the intervenors lacked standing
because the court could not redress the injuries the intervenors claimed
they suffered because of the consent decree.22 The court noted that the
17. Fla. Wildlife Fed’n, 647 F.3d at 1300.
18. Id. at 1300-01.
19. Id. at 1303.
20. Id. at 1302. To have constitutional standing to bring a suit, a plaintiff must show
(1) an injury in fact that is both concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, (2)
that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct being challenged in the suit,
and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Friends of
the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 582 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000).
21. Fla. Wildlife Fed’n, 647 F.3d at 1302.
22. Id. at 1303.
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EPA had a valid independent basis apart from the consent decree for
promulgating the rules called for in the consent decree: its determination
pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(4)23 that Florida’s existing water
quality standard (in this case the narrative nutrient standard) was
inadequate, and its resulting nondiscretionary duty to promulgate
regulations setting out a new standard.24 As a result, “[s]triking down
the consent decree would not affect the validity of the December 2010
Rule and thus the Appellants’ alleged injuries stemming from it are not
redressable.”25
The opinion leaves some confusion as to how the intervenors could
have challenged the rule-making process. The majority opinion states
that
[t]he Intervenors had an open door to bring a full challenge to the
agency’s 2009 Determination that Florida’s existing narrative water
quality standards were inadequate–the real source of their alleged
injuries . . . . They chose instead to challenge a consent decree which
did nothing to change the effect of the 2009 Determination.26
This language suggests that the intervenors did not challenge the 2009
Determination. However, the dissenting judge argues that the majority’s
reasoning is flawed because “[a]lthough Appellants have challenged the
2009 Determination in a separate, pending case, they are now bound by
the terms of the consent decree. Indeed the district judge presiding over
the suit challenging the 2009 Determination has stayed all proceedings
pending resolution of Appellants’ claims surrounding the consent
decree.”27 The dissent characterizes the intervenors’ resulting position
as follows: “If the validity of the 2009 Determination depends on
resolution of the consent decree, but a challenge to the consent decree is
not justiciable because Appellants should instead challenge the 2009
Determination, Appellants have alleged a legally cognizable injury for
which there is literally no legal remedy.”28
II. CLEAN AIR ACT / EVIDENCE
In United States v. Alabama Power Co.,29 the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Alabama excluded from evidence on
23. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(4) (2006).
24. Fla. Wildlife Fed’n, 647 F.3d at 1304.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1306 (emphasis in original).
27. Id. at 1307 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 1308.
29. 773 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (N.D. Ala. 2011).
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Daubert30 grounds the plaintiff government agency’s expert scientific
testimony purporting to show that repair projects at defendant’s power
plants resulted in a significant increase of air pollutant emissions from
the plants, thus making the projects a major modification to the plants,
which in turn would have triggered a pre-construction “New Source
Review” permitting requirement under the Clean Air Act31 and also
required the installation of more modern pollution control technology.32
The court, following a recent decision by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, held that the experts’ threshold
conclusion that there existed a one-to-one ratio of increased power
generation capacity to increased power output at the plants was
unreliable when applied to plants, such as the ones at issue in the case,
that did not run both continuously and at full capacity.33
Alabama Power Company conducted maintenance, repair, and
replacement activities between 1985 and 1997 at plants in the state.34
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) filed suit against the
company following these activities, contending that the activities
constituted “major modifications” to the plants for which Alabama Power
was required to obtain permits pursuant to relevant provisions of the
Clean Air Act and the corresponding State Implementation Plan.35 The
EPA alleged that, as a result of the modifications, plants in Alabama
Power’s system have since been emitting “massive amounts” of sulfur
dioxide and nitrous oxide.36
Power plants in Alabama Power’s system are of three types: units that
operate continuously at their maximum capacity (referred to as
“baseload” units), units that run at less than maximum capacity and can
be used to absorb increases in power demand (called “load following”
30. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7671 (2006).
32. Ala. Power Co., 773 F. Supp. 2d at 1260.
33. Id. at 1258 (citing United States v. Cinergy Corp., 623 F.3d 455, 460 (7th Cir.
2010)).
34. Id. at 1253.
35. Id.
36. Id. The Clean Air Act, passed in 1980, required new sources of air pollution to be
constructed with the best available pollution-preventing technology. Sources of air
pollution that existed when the law was passed were exempted from meeting this
requirement unless they underwent “major modifications” that resulted in a significant net
emissions increase. See 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a) (2006). In such a case, the plant operator
would be required to estimate the increase and obtain a pre-construction permit for the
modification. Id. Routine maintenance that does not result in a significant emissions
increase does not require a permit. Id. A plaintiff claiming a defendant power plant
operator failed to obtain a required permit bears the burden of proving that the operator
made a major modification to a plant. See Ala. Power Co., 773 F. Supp. 2d at 1252-53.
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units), and units that are kept offline and can be started on short notice
to meet greater than anticipated surges in power demand (“quick start
units”).37
The EPA filed the case in its present form in 2005, contending that the
maintenance, repair, and part-replacement projects at Alabama Power’s
plants were major modifications of those plants requiring New Source
Review and pre-construction permitting.38 At issue in the case in its
present posture39 were three coal-fired plants that had undergone
maintenance and repair activities, all of which are operated as “load-
following” plants in Alabama Power’s system.40
To prove that Alabama Power’s projects at the plants constituted
major modifications, the EPA relied on the work of two experts, Robert
Koppe, a plant reliability engineer, and Dr. Ranajit Sahu, an environ-
mental permitting engineer. Mr. Koppe analyzed how the maintenance
and repair projects affected future power generation at the plants, and
Dr. Sahu then determined to what extent increased power generation
caused increased emissions.41 The court described the work of these
experts together as “the heart of the Plaintiff ’s case on emissions.”42
Alabama Power filed a motion in limine to exclude the experts’
testimony from the case on Daubert grounds, contending that the
testimony as applied to the plants was unreliable.43 The court ex-
plained that under a Daubert analysis, the proponent’s burden is not to
show that an expert’s testimony is scientifically correct, but that it is
reliable.44 But the court went on to note that
nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a
district court to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing
data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that
37. See Ala. Power Co., 775 F. Supp. 2d at 1253-54 & n.3.
38. Id. at 1253.
39. Issues involving other plants originally part of the suit had been resolved or
dismissed. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1255-56.
42. Id. at 1255.
43. Id. at 1252.
44. Id.; see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579. As the district court explains, Daubert imposes
a duty on trial judges to ensure that scientific evidence is both reliable and relevant before
it can be admissible. Ala. Power Co., 773 F. Supp. 2d at 1252. The Daubert court set out
four factors to be considered in assessing the reliability of expert scientific testimony: “(1)
whether the theory or technique is capable of being tested; (2) whether the theory or
technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) whether the technique has
a high known or potential rate of error; and (4) whether the theory has gained general
acceptance within the scientific community.” Id. (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94).
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there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the
opinion proffered.45
The court granted Alabama Power’s motion and ruled the experts’
testimony inadmissible.46 The court, relying primarily on the Seventh
Circuit’s reasoning in United States v. Cinergy Corp.,47 concluded that
the experts’ methodology, which presumes that an increase in a plant’s
annual capacity to generate power yields a proportionately equal
increase in its actual annual output of power, which in turn would
increase emissions, is unreliable when applied to a power generating
unit that does not operate continuously and at maximum capacity–a
“baseload” unit.48 The court found that the first unit at issue, Barry
Unit 2, operated at 78.7 percent of its capacity during the times it was
in operation prior to the maintenance project, and was offline, or did not
operate at all, 9.9 percent of the time; the second, Greene County Unit
2, also operated at 78.7 percent of capacity prior to the project; and the
third unit, Gorgas Unit 10, operated at 82.1 percent of capacity.49 The
court accepted that these last two units operated “virtually continuous-
ly.”50 According to the court, then, none of the units operated at
maximum capacity prior to the maintenance and repair project and thus
were not “baseload” units to which the experts’ methodology to deter-
mine increased emissions after the project could be reliably applied.51
Since none of the three plants at issue in the case operated as baseload
units,52 the court concluded that the experts’ conclusions as to power
generation and therefore emissions were unreliable.53
Mr. Koppe testified that his and Dr. Sahu’s method of predicting post-
project emissions could be accurately applied to “cycling”54 units as well
45. Id. (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997)).
46. Id. at 1260.
47. 623 F.3d 455 (7th Cir. 2010).
48. Ala. Power Co., 773 F. Supp. 2d at 1258.
49. Id. at 1258-60.
50. Id. at 1260.
51. Id. at 1258.
52. The court accepted the definition of a “baseload” unit from Cinergy as one that
operates virtually continuously at maximum capacity. Id. at 1257. Mr. Koppe had
employed a broader definition of a baseload unit as one that operates “most of the time
when it is available” but not necessarily at maximum capacity. Id. at 1257 n.8.
53. Id. at 1260. Mr. Koppe contended at the hearing that his methodology could be
applied to “cycling” units, those that change output to meet demand, to predict accurately
the increased emissions resulting from increased capacity. Id. at 1259 n.14.
54. The term “cycling” is used in Cinergy and appears to have the same meaning as
“load-following” in describing the function of a power plant–that is, one online but not
operated at full capacity that can be used to absorb short-notice increases in power
demand. See Cinergy, 623 F.3d at 459-60.
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as “baseload” units as long as certain preliminary facts were true about
the unit.55 Mr. Koppe testified that he had established these facts to
be true about the units at issue in the case, and while the court
challenged this conclusion factually as to Barry Unit 4, the court did not
comment on it as to the other units except to note that Mr. Koppe “did
not explain these limitations on the formula in his report,” concluding
that the units were not “baseload” units under the definition adopted by
the Cinergy court and thus the Koppe/Sahu conclusions as to increased
emissions were unreliable because the units at issue did not operate
continuously at full capacity.56 The court seemed to base its decision
not so much on the four factors of Daubert as on the proposition, as the
court stated it, that “Daubert does not permit the Court to admit opinion
evidence which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the
expert.”57 In other words, the district judge was not satisfied that Dr.
Koppe explained how his data supported his conclusion with regard to
“cycling” or “load-following” plants such as the ones in the case.58
The court’s ruling appears to gut the EPA’s case, without Mr. Koppe’s
and Dr. Sahu’s findings the EPA cannot prove that the maintenance and
repair projects constituted major modifications to the plants. If the
projects were not major modifications, no preconstruction permits were
required regardless of whether there was an increase in emissions from
the plants after the projects were completed.
III. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT / ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT
In Defenders of Wildlife v. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management,
Regulation, & Enforcement,59 plaintiff Defenders of Wildlife (DOW)
challenged the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and
Enforcement’s (BOEMRE) continued acceptance of bids for deepwater oil
and gas drilling leases under a 2007 lease sale program that was based
on an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) completed in 2007—after
55. Ala. Power Co., 773 F. Supp. 2d at 1259 n.14. First, that the additional available
hours at the unit will actually be used post-project; second, that the unit will not spend
more time in reserve shutdown post-project than it had pre-project; and third, the output
factor for the unit will not decrease post-project. Id.
56. Id. at 1259-60 & n.14.
57. Id. at 1259. The court appears to change the meaning somewhat of the language
it cited from General Electric v. Joiner for this proposition. See id. The language in the
Joiner opinion permits the trial court to exclude opinion that is related to data only by the
say-so of the expert; here, the district court’s characterization is that Daubert requires the
court to exclude such evidence. Compare id., with Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146-47.
58. See Ala. Power Co., 773 F. Supp. 2d at 1259 n.14.
59. 791 F. Supp. 2d 1158 (S.D. Ala. 2011).
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the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig explosion on April 20, 2010 (“Deep-
water Incident” or “Incident”) and subsequent oil spill.60 The United
States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama dismissed as
moot, among other reasons, the portion of DOW’s claims that related to
lease sales under the 2007 program that BOEMRE cancelled after the
Deepwater Incident pending its preparation of a Supplemental EIS
(SEIS) in response to the Incident, but the court allowed to stand the
claims related to lease sales that were not cancelled after the Incident
and for which BOEMRE continued to accept bids in reliance on the 2007
EIS.61
Pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,62 BOEMRE sells
leases for offshore oil and gas drilling. BOEMRE’s practice is to develop
programs for lease sales in five-year increments. The program sets out
a schedule for the sale of leases for that period. BOEMRE completes an
EIS covering all sales for the period and then offers and awards the
leases through a competitive bid process. When a bidder is successful,
it submits an exploration plan to BOEMRE for approval. If the lease
holder discovers oil or gas during the exploration phase, it then submits
to BOEMRE for approval a development plan identifying the number
and location of production wells, and upon approval, the lessee drills for
and recovers oil or gas.63 BOEMRE developed such a program covering
the years 2007-2012 (the 2007 Program) which comprised eleven
separate lease sales, including a sale known as Lease Sale 213. Each
sale included multiple leases that were let for bid. BOEMRE prepared
a single EIS for these eleven separate sales. Then, for each separate
lease sale, BOEMRE prepared an Environmental Assessment (EA) that
was keyed to the EIS and that resulted in a Finding of No Significant
Impact (FONSI) on the environment for that sale, beyond any impacts
already identified in the 2007 EIS.64 As the court explained, “if the
Multi-sale EIS is invalid, the EAs tiered off that EIS are similarly
problematic.”65
The Deepwater Horizon Incident occurred in April, 2010. On July 30,
2010, BOEMRE sent letters to the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS) and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)
requesting that these agencies reinitiate consultation on the effects of
the 2007 Leasing Program on the Gulf as required under the Endan-
60. Id. at 1161.
61. Id. at 1182.
62. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356(a) (2006).
63. Defenders of Wildlife, 791 F. Supp. 2d at 1161 n.2.
64. Id. at 1164 n.6.
65. Id.
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gered Species Act (ESA).66 On November 10, 2010, BOEMRE an-
nounced its intention to prepare a SEIS specifically in response to the
Incident and halted all lease sales pending completion of the SEIS
except for sales in Lease Sale 213, where BOEMRE continued to accept
and approve bids for leases following the Incident and prior to the
completion of the SEIS.67
In its suit, DOW made four specific claims: first, that BOEMRE
violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)68 and the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)69 by continuing to rely on the
conclusions of the 2007 EIS governing the eleven lease sales even though
the conclusions of the EIS were invalid after the Incident; second, that
more specifically as to Lease Sale 213, BOEMRE accepted over 200 new
bids for leases after the Incident while relying on a FONSI based on the
2007 EIS for that sale in violation of the APA; third, that BOEMRE
violated the APA and the ESA by failing to reinitiate consultation with
the NMFS and the FWS based on new data gathered from the Incident
showing that drilling in the area may harm endangered or threatened
species and critical habitat; and fourth, that BOEMRE violated the APA
and the ESA by proceeding with lease sales in the Gulf after the
Incident without ensuring that by continuing to permit drilling in the
Gulf BOEMRE was not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of
any species.70 DOW sought a declaratory judgment that BOEMRE had
violated the specified statutes, vacateur of lease bids under lease sale
213 that BOEMRE accepted after the Incident, vacateur and remand of
the 2007 EIS and an injunction against any further lease sales pursuant
to the EIS until BOEMRE prepared a SEIS, and an order requiring
BOEMRE to reinitiate consultation with the other agencies to account
for information learned from the Incident.71
BOEMRE moved to dismiss the first, third, and part of the fourth
claims on grounds that they were moot and unripe. BOEMRE did not
move to dismiss claim two, which focused specifically on BOEMRE’s
acceptance and approval of bids under Lease Sale 213. Several
associations representing various oil and gas companies, and Chevron,
U.S.A., were allowed to intervene in the case, and moved to dismiss
DOW’s claim in its entirety, including claim two, on similar grounds as
BOEMRE and also on the basis of improper venue with respect to all
66. Id. at 1169-70; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006); 50 C.F.R. § 402.16(b) (2011).
67. Defenders of Wildlife, 791 F. Supp. 2d at 1164, 1166, 1167 n.13.
68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4357 (2006).
69. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-596 (2006).
70. See Defenders of Wildlife, 791 F. Supp. 2d at 1161-62.
71. Id.
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claims, lack of federal action remaining with respect to Lease Sale 213,
and claim four on the basis that BOEMRE had complied with its
obligation to ensure no endangerment under the ESA.72
The court considered BOEMRE’s motions first.73 The court dismissed
DOW’s first claim as moot except to the extent it applied to Lease Sale
213 because BOEMRE had cancelled other lease sales in the 2007
Program and announced its intention to prepare an SEIS in response to
the Deepwater Incident and not to resume conducting lease sales until
the SEIS was completed.74 The court also dismissed DOW’s third
claim, that BOEMRE was required under the ESA to reinitiate
consultation with other agencies having jurisdiction to determine the
effects of the Incident on species and habitat in the Gulf, for the same
reason: BOEMRE had in fact requested renewed consultation with the
NMFS and the FWS, which the court stated was the extent of its
obligation under the provision of the ESA relevant to DOW’s third
claim.75
The court denied BOEMRE’s motion to dismiss DOW’s fourth claim,
that BOEMRE was in violation of its independent duty under the ESA
to ensure that its actions did not jeopardize the continued existence of
any endangered or threatened species in the Gulf.76 BOEMRE had
moved to dismiss this claim as unripe because it applied to future lease
sales, and the agency argued that because no future lease sales had been
approved any action the agency would or would not take with respect to
the protection of species was speculative.77 However, the court
construed DOW’s claim four, as set out in its complaint, as applying only
to “actions that BOEMRE has taken and is taking now in the wake of
the Deepwater Horizon spill, rather than lease sale approvals that may
or may not happen at some future time.”78 The court also noted that
DOW confirmed this interpretation of its claim in its response brief to
BOEMRE’s motion to dismiss.79 The court did not specify what present
actions of BOEMRE claim four might apply to, but it seems that, again,
the only ongoing actions involved Lease Sale 213 because the agency had
halted other sales pending completion of the SEIS in response to the
Incident.80 This more narrow interpretation of claim four, though,
72. Id. at 1162-64, 1172.
73. Id. at 1164-72.
74. Id. at 1166-67.
75. Id. at 1170.
76. Id. at 1172.
77. Id. at 1171.
78. Id. at 1172.
79. Id.
80. See id.
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seems to mean that any challenge to BOEMRE’s future approval of lease
sales based on the potential inadequacy of the SEIS with respect to
listed species under the ESA would have to be the subject of a later suit.
The court next turned to the Intervenors’ non-redundant motions to
dismiss, including a motion to dismiss the claims as they related to
Lease Sale 213, the sale in which DOW alleged, and BOEMRE did not
dispute, that BOEMRE had continued to accept and approve bids for
leases in reliance on the 2007 EIS, following the Deepwater Incident.81
The Intervenors contended that with respect to Lease Sale 213,
BOEMRE was under no obligation to prepare an SEIS after the
Deepwater Incident because there was no major Federal action
remaining to occur at that time.82 BOEMRE published a Final Notice
of Sale for Lease Sale 213 on February 12, 2010, and, at that time,
announced that a public reading of bids would occur on March 17, 2010.
The Deepwater Incident happened on April 10, 2010. Thus, all the bids
for Lease Sale 213 had been received prior to the Incident; however,
BOEMRE still had to analyze the bids and determine that the highest
bid for each tract represented fair market value. This bid acceptance
process continued for several months after the Incident. The Intervenors
contended that the last major Federal action in connection with Lease
Sale 213 was the bid reading in March (at which time BOEMRE had
apparently received all bids for Lease Sale 213). The Intervenors argued
that BOEMRE’s only actions in connection with the sale after the
Incident were to evaluate the bids for economic factors, not environmen-
tal ones, before awarding them.83 The court applied a definition of
“major federal action” used by the District of Columbia Circuit stating
81. Id. at 1172-75. The court denied the Intervenors’ motion to dismiss for improper
venue. Id. at 1174-75. The Intervenors argued that venue was improper because none of
BOEMRE’s actions being challenged by DOW took place in Alabama. Id. at 1173-74.
However, the court noted the great weight of authority for the proposition that intervening
parties, who have voluntarily elected to enter a lawsuit already ongoing in a particular
venue, cannot then claim that the venue is improper, and ruled consistent with this rule.
Id. at 1174-75. The court also denied the Intervenors’ motion to dismiss claim four with
respect to Lease Sale 213, which was based on a similar ground to their challenge to claim
two, that Lease Sale 213 had been completed prior to the Incident and therefore BOEMRE
was not presently taking any action that could jeopardize a protected species. Id. at 1178-
79. The court rejected this argument for the same reason as it did the Intervenors’ motion
directed at claim two: BOEMRE continued to analyze and accept bids from Lease Sale 213
after the Incident, and if those actions jeopardized any protected species, then claim four
is cognizable. Id.
82. An agency is required to supplement an EIS only where there remains a “major
Federal action[]” yet to occur at the time the agency learns of new information that could
render an existing EIS invalid. Id. at 1176.
83. Id. at 1175-77.
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that a major federal action requiring supplementation of an EIS is one
where the government retains the discretion to act in a way that “might
usefully be informed by further environmental review.”84 The court
noted that while BOEMRE may have been primarily interested in
economic criteria in reviewing and accepting bids, it nevertheless
retained the discretion to reject a bid for any reason prior to formal
acceptance,85 and the mere submission of a high bid “did not confer
upon the bidders any right to lease a particular tract without agency
approval.”86
84. Id. at 1176.
85. Id. at 1177. Among other reasons, the court noted that the Federal Register Notice
announcing Lease Sale 213 stated “The United States reserves the right to reject any and
all bids . . . prior to issuance of a written acceptance of a bid.” Id.; 75 FED. REG. 6874, 6881
(Feb. 12, 2010).
86. Defenders of Wildlife, 791 F. Supp. 2d at 1178.
